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Abstract 
Wireless sensor networks has a bright future because of its low-cost, save-power, and easy implementation .etc. However, its 
security problems have become hot research topics in many applications. Sinkhole attack is just one of frequently encountered 
security problems, which is easily  combined with other attacks to cause more damage. In order to prevent sinkhole attack, we 
do some research on it, and one way to detect the sinkhole attack based on the redundancy mechanism is proposed in this 
paper. For the suspicious nodes, messages are sent to them through multi-paths. By evaluating the replied comprehensively, 
the attacked nodes are finally confirmed. Lastly, a simulation is performed to test the effectiveness of the method. And the 
simulation shows that the approach could work to some extent. 
© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.  
Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of the organizers of ITQM 2014 
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1. Introduction 
Wireless sensor networks are a multi-hop temporary autonomous system made up of a group of mobile nodes 
with wireless transmitters and receivers. Not relying on any preset infrastructure, it would achieve automatic 
organization and running in arbitrary mesh topology. Together with micro-processing and wireless 
communication capabilities, they are widely used on occasions which require rapid deployment and dynamic 
networking, such as military tactical communications and emergency communications. They are becoming a 
research subject of critical significance in practical application.  
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However, wireless sensor networks are vulnerable to various types of attacks , including Sybil, selective 
forwarding, SinkholeǃWormhole  and HELLO FLOOD. Sinkhole attack, mainly discussed in this paper, is a 
relatively common attack. The nodes attacked claim to be able to provide a single -hop, high-quality path to the 
base station, which attracts the neighbor nodes to change the original route. And packets  sent to the base station 
are discarded or forwarded to the sinkhole attacker, thus  seriously damaging the load balancing of the network.  
It is easily combined with other attacks, causing greater damage to the network. There are some defects in the 
former Sinkhole detections [1-8], for example, the cooperative malicious nodes could not be detected and the 
detection algorithm would be complicated. Thus here we raise a new one based on redundancy mechanism. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, some research work before about sinkhole attack 
some research work about multi-path selection- the core of the algorithm is introduced briefly. In Section 3, the 
new approach we raise is discussed thoroughly, a key point in the paper. Section 4 is the simulation of the 
algorithm. Finally, we summarize our work.  
2. Detection Algorithm 
Path in the typical multi-path selection in wireless sensor networks is the connection between nodes. And 
either of them is the Sink node. The process of the path establishment consists of three stages: route request, route 
reply and route establishment [9, 10]. Here, the Sink node is node A or node B. 
(1) route request 
Node A in the network broadcasts route request packet to node B. All nodes in the communication range  node 
of A would receive it. The packet contains the field named Path to record the path information, a collection of 
nodes the packet passes. In this process, nodes would record neighbor nodes and update their neighbor lists until 
the route request packet reaches node B. 
(2) route reply  
When the node firstly receives the route request packet, it would save the sending node as a parent node, and 
add their own identity to the field-Path in route request packet, and then transmit the packet. In this stage, node 
B receives the packet and would send the route reply packet to its parent node including the neighbor nodes. 
Likewise, other nodes would also do it until the node is node A. 
(3) route establishment 
Node A would build the network topology according to the received packet information. Then multi-path 
between node A and node B are calculated according to Dijkstra shortest path algorithm. 
It’s supposed that nodes in the wireless sensor networks are static and we have known suspicious nodes in the 
wireless sensor networks. Before the algorithm, some definition are given. 
Definition 1. Set S={1, 2, 3, 4……N}, which means all of the nodes in wireless sensor networks. 
Definition 2. Set Ssus={1, 2, 3,……m}, which means the suspicious nodes in the networks. 
Definition 3. Set Smal={null}, which means the malicious nodes in the networks. 
Apparently, there is a relation between sets: Sل SsusلSmal. 
The task is to identify which nodes are the malicious nodes. The Sinkhole detection algorithm proposed here 
based on redundancy mechanisms is to build M disjoint paths between the original node and the suspicious node .   
2.1. Original nodes selection  
(1)  Source nodes selection 
We learn from the existing multi-path establishment methods and give our own algorithm. Firstly, we should 
know how to select the original nodes. 
Definition 4. Set Scre={null}, which means the credible nodes in the networks. And Scre=S- Ssus. 
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Definition 5. Set Sori={null}, which means the original nodes we will select in the networks. And it includes 
M nodes randomly chosen in the set Scre, that is Sori=C(M, Scre). 
Definition 6. Set Sx={null},  which would be used later. 
(2) Multi-path selection 
Because the network is static, we can know the position of all the nodes in it. We imagine the Sink node would 
record the coordinate information of all the nodes as shown in Table 3-1. 
Table 1. Coordinate information of nodes 
Node ID X Y 
1 x1 y1 
2 x2 Y2 
ĂĂ …… …… 
N xn yn 
 
In the Table 1, N signifies the number of nodes in the network. We note the position of Sink node is (0,0) and 
other nodes’ position would be calculated according to it. And the position of node i (i א[1, N) is(xi, yi) . 
Considering processing power, storage and communication capacity of the Sink node, we assign more tasks 
to Sink node and make Sink node calculate the M paths between nodes . We also use the typical three phases - 
routing request, routing feedback and routing establishment to describe the process of paths building. And the 
paths is between node A in set Scre and node B in set Ssus. 
x routing request 
Node A only need to send a "routing request packet" to the Sink node. The reason why quotation marks is that 
it is different from the routing request packet mentioned in Section 2. The packet is forwarded to the Sink node 
instead of Node B. The main role of the packet is to inform Sink node to calculate the M shortest path between 
node A and node B. 
x routing reply 
The main idea of the algorithm is to calculate shortest paths between node A and node B by Sink node. It’s 
obviously that the shortest distance between two points is a straight line. So we can easily know that the shortest 
corresponding paths are composed of the nodes near to the straight line. The process is divided to two steps: 
Step 1. Straight line calculation 
According to Table 1, node A is known in(xAˈyA) and the node B is known(xBˈyB). The straight line 
between them is expressed as the formula (1): 
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Straight line is represented by the blue line in Fig 1. And the scope of the nodes looking for on the path 
between node A and node B is the rectangle as shown in Fig 1. 
 
 
714   Fang-Jiao Zhang et al. /  Procedia Computer Science  31 ( 2014 )  711 – 720 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1.  Effective area is calculated path 
Specific coordinates satisfy the following equation: 
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Step 2. Path nodes selection 
 
Obviously, we can select the nodes within the rectangular area shown in Figure 3-1. The nodes are ordered 
by position X of the node ascending. And for next node, we choose the node which is the communication range 
of the nodes xi and whose abscissa is as big as possible and vertical axis is nearest to the straight line. A 
satisfying node can match the following rule: 
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When xi؄ xj, if and only if formula˄3˅is trueˈthe node is node i; otherwise, the node is node j. 
The chosen nodes would be selected one by one and they would be saved in an array path[N]. The above 
is sorted by abscissa x-axis; alternatively, you can also choose the y-axis. Besides, the paths calculated by the 
two ways are compared. And the one with fewer hops is a spreferred one. 
After the Sink node finishes the calculating of the paths , it would send the paths information to node A, 
where we assumed that the communication between node A and Sink node is trusted.  The XML language is 
used to express the path information. It is extremely simple, compatible with the existing agreements, unified 
management data access format, sharing and interaction of data between different applications etc., all of which 
makes XML ideal for data transmission. 
x routing establishment 
Node A receives the path information transmitted from Sink node, and then to construct the routing 
information reaching node B. 
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Here the value of M is critical. The higher the M is , the more successful the detection is. But the following 
is the increasing energy consumption of nodes. When selecting the value of M, it is needy to make a tradeoff 
between detection rate and power consumption. 
The algorithm mentioned above is to establish M disjoint shortest paths between credible nodes and 
suspicious nodes, which are used to detect whether nodes  are attacked in the network. 
2.2. Detection process 
Trusted node forwards the routing request packets on M paths established. And we confirm whether the 
suspicious nodes are malicious or not by replied messages by suspicious nodes described in Fig 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
             Fig. 2.   Multi-path detection 
After node Ai receives a reply from node B, it would determine whether the next hop address in the replied 
packet is same to node B. If it’s the same, the replied packet would be not processed; if not, the information of 
the suspicious node B is sent to the Sink node. Sink node would ad d up the corresponding information to 
determine whether the node is malicious or not and the table structure used to justify is as follows: 
Table 2. Decision table 
Ssus P1   P2  P3 ĂĂ PM flag 
1 - - - - - - 
2 - - - - - - 
ĂĂ …… …… …… …… …… …… 
Nsus - - - - - - 
     
 In Table 2, Nsus represents the number of set Ssus and flag represents whether the node is malicious or not, 
whose value is true or false. After all the suspicious nodes shake hands with credible nodes, fill the blank of the 
Table 2 with their own identity. The next is to do a summarization of the number of cell whose content is equal 
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to its X-axis, which is named as NumOfBi. If the proportion of NumOfBi becomes more than α, then we determine 
that Bi is a malicious node as shown in the formula (4). The value of α can be customized and has a close relation 
of the accuracy of detection of Sinkhole attacks are closely related. 
Dt0
1XP2I%L   (4) 
Meanwhile, for cells whose content is not equal to its X-axis, add the content of the cell to set Sx. For each 
element named as xi in set Sx and the node exists in Ssus, Nxi is the number xi appear in Sx. We use the formula 
(5) to determine if the node xi is malicious or not. Nsus represents the number of the nodes in set Ssus. 
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The realization of the Sinkhole detection algorithm is as follows: 
Step 1. Set the threshold num1 = 0, num2 = 0. 
Step 2. If num1≥Nsus then jump to Step 6; otherwise, num1 = num1 +1, multi-path handshake with the 
node Bnum1. 
Step 3. If num2≥M, then jump to Step 2; otherwise, num2 = num2 +1, credible node Anum2 send a routing 
request packet to suspicious node Bnum1 through multiple paths Pi (i = 1, 2, 3 ......, M) . 
Step 4. Node Anum2 receives routing reply packet from Bnum1 and extract the nexthop field. 
Step 5. Compare the values of the next hop and Bnum1.If they are the same, do nothing; otherwise, return 
the next hop value to the Sink node. And the Sink node counts the corresponding values. Jump to Step 2. 
Step 6. According to the information received, Sink node determine whether the suspicious 
nodes are malicious. 
Step 7. Set the threshold num1 = 0 again. 
Step 8.  If num1≥Nsus, then jump to Step 10; otherwise, num1 = num1 +1, and count NumOfBi. 
Meanwhile, add the node except Bi to the set Sx. 
Step 9. If ୒୳୫୓୤஻೔୑  ≥ Ƚ  ˈthen the node Bi is added to the set Smal. Jump to Step 8. 
Step 10.  Calculate Sx=Sx – Ssus∩Sx. 
Step 11.  Set the threshold num1 = 0 again. 
Step 12.  If num1 ≥ Nx, it finishes; otherwise, num1 = num1 +1, count Nx. 
Step 13 If ୒୳୫୓୤௑೔୑כே౗ౘ౤౥౨ౣ౗ౢ  ≥ 
Ⱦˈthen the node Xi add to the set Smal. Jump to Step 12. 
3. Experimental results 
3.1. Experiment setting 
The simulations are performed to prove the feasibility of Sinkhole detection. The simulation tool, NS2, is used 
do some experiments. In the simulations, the nodes are static and randomly distributed. The scope of activities is 
1000m * 1000 meters. The network topology is shown in Fig 3, where red nodes is the attacked nodes by Sinkhole 
and black ones are normal. At this time, there are five attacked nodes numbered 1-5 and we set node 0 as the 
Sink node. 
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            Fig. 3. Network topology 
3.2. Experimental results and analysis 
In simulation experiments, the detection rate, the mistake rate and miss rate of the Sinkhole attack are used to 
verify the detection algorithm proposed in this paper. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.  the comparison of detection rates based on multi-path detection 
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Fig 4 depicts the comparison of detection rates based on multi-path detection. It‘s clearly seen that when M 
is 4 or more, the detection rates of the attack are similar. Considering the efficiency of the algorithm and the 
energy consumption of nodes, M is set to 4.  
In addition, some experiments are done by adding detection algorithm to common routing protocols AODV 
and DSR protocols in the wireless sensor networks shown in Fig 5. As we can see from the figure that, the 
detection rate of the DSR protocol is generally more efficient than the AODV protocol with the number of 
attacked nodes increasing. 
The detection algorithm raised in the paper is compared with the classical detection algorithm- BM in Fig 6. 
From the figure, it concludes that the algorithm here has a higher detection rate. And the Sinkhole detection 
algorithm proposed could effectively detect the nodes attacked in wireless sensor networks. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5.  chart of detection rate comparison 
There are many causes of mistake detection and the Sinkhole detection rate of 100% is not realistic. we can 
only try to high the detection rate. In addition, CBR data streams are transmitted in the same frequency in the 
simulation, thus data congestion tends to conflict resulting in some errors of the detection algorithm.  
Derived from the experiments, Sinkhole attack greatly affects the performance of the network. And with the 
number of attacked nodes increasing in the network, it is more destructive. It’s  of important significance to 
study detection algorithm of Sinkhole attack.  
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Fig. 6.   The comparison of detection rates using different detection algorithm  
4. Conclusion 
In the paper, the main contribution is to propose a new Sinkhole detection algorithm based the multi-path 
selection. The simulation also proves the feasibility of the approach. In our future work, we will perfect the 
algorithm raised continuously and extensively, where there are still many problems existing. Meanwhile, we will 
improve the simulation more visually. Beyond that, the algorithm would be practiced. 
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